This paper uses a global data set of 350 microfinance institutions (MFIs) in 70 countries to study the common belief that women are generally better credit risks in microfinance than men. The results confirm that a higher percentage of female clients in MFIs is associated with lower portfolio risk, fewer write-offs, and fewer provisions, all else being equal. Interaction effects reveal that, while focus on women is generally associated with enhanced repayment, this trend is stronger for nongovernmental organizations, individual-based lenders, and regulated MFIs.
INTRODUCTION
Microfinance-financial services tailored to the poor-has been celebrated for its ability to reach out to women and enhance their welfare. Since its beginning as experimental schemes in Asia and Latin America in the 1970s, microfinance has been concerned, above all, with women. The objective of the Microcredit Summit Campaign, which plays a central role in the promotion of microfinance, is -to ensure that 175 million of the world's poorest families, especially women, receive credit for self-employment and other financial and business services‖ (our emphasis).
1 Indeed, many microfinance institutions (MFIs) do target women. In this study's data set, women represent 73% of microfinance customers, similar to figures reported in previous literature (e.g., Cull et al., 2007) . The strong appeal of microfinance also lies in its high repayment records. In our data set, only 6% of the total loan portfolio, on average, is overdue more than 30 days, and only 1% will be written off, on average. From a credit design perspective, this is interesting, since modern microfinance was intended as a response to the high default rates in subsidized rural credit, mostly provided to men, in the 1950 -1980 's (Hulme and Mosley, 1996 .
The targeting of women has been suggested to generate high repayment rates for MFIs.
Microfinance advocacy networks and sponsors, as well as bilateral and multilateral development aid agencies, regularly assert that women are good credit risks. For example, the World Bank argues (2007) , -Experience has shown that repayment is higher among female borrowers, mostly due to more conservative investments and lower moral hazard risk‖ (p. 124). Armendariz and Morduch (2005, p. 139) , evaluating different techniques to reduce repayment defaults, consider the targeting of women as a technique in its own right, alongside group lending and dynamic repayment incentives.
But do we actually know that women are better credit risks than men? The fact is that the relation between an MFI's repayment performance and its targeting of women has hardly been rigorously studied, and existing empirical evidence is mixed. Besides anecdotal evidence and the analysis of one or two MFIs in a given country (see, e.g., Khandker et al., 1995, in Bangladesh and Kevane and Wydick, 2001, in Guatemala) , no paper provides a detailed empirical analysis of the gender-repayment relation within a global and longitudinal context.
Sponsors seem to raise the repayment argument without ever furnishing empirical evidence.
We thus respond to Cornwall et al. (2007) , who argue that gender development discourses are too often based on myths and simplistic slogans.
This paper sets out to be the first rigorous global study of the relation between MFI gender focus and repayment performance, using a data set spanning 350 MFIs in 70 countries over 11 years. Repayment is studied through a variety of measures, such as portfolios at risk, writeoffs, and provision expenses. We take into account the specific methodological problems associated with this type of estimation, such as a) isolating the gender effect from other MFI or institutional influences on repayment and b) the time-invariant nature of many covariates.
The findings indicate that a higher percentage of female clients is significantly associated with lower portfolio risk and fewer portfolio write-offs, after controlling for a number of MFIspecific factors, as well as institutional factors. Additionally, MFIs with a higher proportion of female clients carry fewer provisions, additional evidence that focusing on women significantly reduces MFIs' perceived credit risk. Findings further indicate that not all MFIs benefit to a similar degree from targeting women. Interaction effects reveal that specifically nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), individual-based lenders, and regulated MFIs benefit more from focusing on women. The finding that identifiable MFI characteristics interact with the targeting of women is particularly interesting, since this can inform both microfinance practitioners and those interested in gender policies.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on gender and repayment and presents the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the data and the statistical methods employed. Section 4 reports our findings and discusses a number of robustness checks carried out. Section 5 presents the study's conclusions and possible implications.
GENDER AND REPAYMENT
There is no lack of studies arguing that women outperform men in terms of repayment in microfinance. For instance, Armendariz and Morduch (2005) report that, in its initial phase, the Grameen Bank included men among its customers. However, the bank decided to switch to a nearly entirely female clientele due to repayment problems with men. Hossain (1988) reports that in Bangladesh, 81% of women had no repayment problems, compared with 74% of men. Similarly, Khandker et al. (1995) find that 15.3% of Grameen's male borrowers had repayment problems, compared with only 1.3% of the women. In addition, in Bangladesh, Sharma and Zeller (1997) report that credit groups with higher percentages of women had significantly better repayment rates. From Malawi, Hulme (1991) reports that 92% of women paid on time, compared with 83% of men, and Gibbons and Kasim (1991) find that in Malaysia 95% of women repaid their loans, compared with 72% of the men. Finally, in a study from Guatemala, Kevane and Wydick (2001) report that female credit groups had better loan repayment records than male groups.
On the other hand, a number of more recent studies find that, when controlling for other factors, there is no significant relation between gender and repayment. Enhanced female repayment rates are driven by a focus on nonfinancial services in the case of Bangladesh (Godquin, 2004) , the adaptation of loan methodologies to local contexts in the United States (Bhatt and Tang, 2002) , and group methodology, local economic opportunities, and types of clients' livelihoods in Ethiopia (Brehanu and Fufa, 2008) . Finally, BRI, in Indonesia, has never had any specific focus on women but has achieved nearly perfect repayment rates over several years (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005) . Perhaps the argument of women being better credit risks is not as clear-cut after all? The fact that former studies are based on anecdotal evidence or are very limited in geographical and institutional scope warrants the need for this global study.
Why would women be better in honoring their loan contracts than men? One argument is that women invest in types of businesses that allow easier repayment. For instance, based upon her experience in Grameen villages in Bangladesh, Todd (1996) argues that women are more conservative or cautious in their investment strategies and therefore have better repayment records. Recently, Agier and Szafarz (2010) find similar results in Brazil. Johnson (2004) highlights that women's business activities often imply a quick turnover, which is more adaptable to the regular repayments demanded by most MFIs. By contrast, seasonal and risky activities such as agriculture, which are more often a male preserve, are a poor fit to microfinance modalities (Morvant-Roux, forthcoming). In many countries, there is also a long collective history of debt forgiveness in agriculture, which often translates into a male culture of -nonrepayment‖ (Servet, 2006) . Another argument is that women have fewer credit opportunities than men and must repay their loans to ensure continued access to credit (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005) . A premise of these arguments is that the women are actually the ones controlling the loans; however, several studies indicate that loans taken out by women are in some cases used and controlled by the men within their households (Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Rahman, 1999; Kabeer, 2001; Mayoux, 2001) . Thus, if men are the ones using the loans, the former arguments do not hold.
However, regardless of who controls the money, it still make sense for the MFI to know whether contracting with women lead to better repayment performance than contracting with men. Along this line, several papers argue that contracts with women are easier to monitor and enforce. For example, Rahman (2001) and Goetz and Gupta (1996) indicate that women are more easily influenced by peer pressure in credit groups and more sensitive to the interventions of loan officers. Ameen (2004) states that women have a lower opportunity cost of time than men and are therefore more inclined to have contact with the MFI and credit groups, with a positive impact on repayment. Moreover, female customers tend to stay closer to home rather than going out to work, and can therefore be more easily monitored by the MFI (Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Armendariz and Morduch, 2005) .
Not all arguments favor women as a good credit risk, however. The simple fact that women, on average, are poorer than their male peers should indicate that repayments are more troublesome. Phillips and Bhatia-Panthaki (2007) contend that women entrepreneurs tend to be overrepresented in traditional sectors with lower profits, fewer growth opportunities, and harsher competition, which should make them less able to honor their credit contracts.
Given the previous discussions, the relation between gender and repayment-rates remains unclear. However, in line with common beliefs in the industry, we propose the following 
c. Scope of activities
Some MFIs offer a range of nonfinancial services alongside microfinance, such as health services and basic literacy training (Godquin, 2004) or business training (Khandker et al., 1995) . Edgcomb and Barton (1998) suggest that nonfinancial services improve not only the borrower's ability to repay but also the quality of the relations between MFIs and their clients.
Since they are generally poorer and have lower education, women can be expected to be more responsive and more in need of the additional training (Mayoux, 2001; Armendariz and Morduch, 2005) . Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
e. Regulation
Regulated MFIs are monitored by banking authorities. It is argued that regulation can lead to mission drift if requirements divert attention away from serving the poor, but this has not been rigorously studied (Mersland and Strøm, 2010) . Others argue that regulations can hold back innovation in lending technologies, which has been a driving force in microfinance development and outreach to women (Dichter, 1997; Hardy et al., 2003 Benchmarks based on data from 704 MFIs report mean and median total assets of 45,6 and 6,2 million US dollars respectively, the mean total assets for the MFIs included in this study are 6,5 million and the median MFI holds 1,9 million in assets. Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and quartiles for a number of key variables in our sample. We see that the average MFI has a total loan portfolio of $4,225,000, serves 17,111 clients, and has nine years of experience in microfinance. The average outstanding loan is $787 and annual net returns are $209,000. The annual portfolio yield is 0.39, on average, illustrating the high interest rates typical in microfinance, and operational self-sufficiency (OSS) is 1.12, indicating that, on average, the MFI covers its operating costs.
As far as the repayment variables are concerned, PaR30 equals 0.06, on average, which means that 6% of the total loan portfolio is 30 days or more overdue. However, the median value is only 3%, which indicates that the distribution is somewhat skewed, with a number of MFIs with high PaR30 values. On average, write-offs comprise around 1% of the total loan portfolio, and the median value is also 1%. The provision expense rate is 3%, on average, with a median value of 2%.
For the gender variables, we see that, on average, MFIs have 73% female clients. Moreover, the 75th percentile in the distribution of female clients is 1, indicating that at least 25% of the MFIs focus exclusively on women. The conscious gender bias dummy variable indicates that around 40% of MFIs have a female bias in their lending.
< Insert - Table 1 . Summary statistics‖ here > Table 2 
where PaR30 i,t is the portfolio at risk for MFI i in year t; FEM i,t is the percentage of female clients; Z i,t is a matrix of MFI-specific controls, such as size, experience, average loan size, dummies for lending methodology, and rural/urban market activity; and X i,t is a matrix of controls that capture the conditions of the country C in which the MFI is active.
A number of methodological issues surrounding this kind of estimation require close attention. First, it is important that all variables potentially affecting repayment be included explicitly as controls in the regression equation. If variables are omitted that affect repayment and which are also correlated with the proportion of female borrowers, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates could be biased (Stock and Watson, 2007, p. 186) . Therefore, in addition to OLS, we also analyze a pooled random effects (RE) model that takes into account unobserved MFI-specific effects as follows: (2) where  i is the unobserved MFI-specific effect. The main benefit of such an RE model is that it accounts for all unobserved heterogeneity potentially affecting the dependent variable, thereby reducing concerns for omitted variables bias (Lensink and Mersland, 2009; Hartarska, 2005) .
Second, many of the controls that need to be estimated are time invariant. The RE model is therefore better suited than, for instance, a fixed effects (FE) model, where time-invariant
covariates cannot be estimated because all variables are first-differenced. However, incorporating time-invariant covariates in an RE model requires the additional assumption that they never be correlated with the unobserved MFI-specific effect. When this assumption does not hold, the RE estimator can yield inconsistent and biased estimates (Baltagi et al., 2003) . Therefore, besides performing pooled OLS and RE, we also report the fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD) estimator developed by Plümper and Troeger (2007) and applied to microfinance performance regressions in Lensink and Mersland (2009) Finally, repayments can vary over time because of idiosyncratic or macro-level shocks. We account for this by including time dummies in all regressions and using clustered standard errors.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
(a) Relation between gender and repayment Mersland and Strøm (2008) , who find that performance differences between NGOs and nonNGOs are minimal, and Mersland and Strøm (2009a) , who demonstrate that group lending has only a limited effect on repayment.
In columns (4) to (6) of Table 3 , gender preference is measured through the dummy variable for conscious gender bias. As can be seen, this dummy is, like the proportion of female clients, negatively related to the portfolio at risk, with the coefficients being highly significant. Those MFIs that report a conscious bias toward women have a significantly lower PaR30, and estimated coefficients range between -0.01 for OLS and -0.02 for RE and FEVD.
A value of -0.02 indicates that the PaR30 of MFIs that have a deliberate focus on women is, on average, 2 percentage points lower. Given an average PaR30 of 6% in the entire sample, this result is not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant. Looking at the controls, we again see a negative association with size, portfolio growth, dumRURAL, and HDI consistent with the previous discussion.
In Panel B of Table 3 , repayment is measured by the actual loan loss write-offs, and again gender is measured through both the proportion of female borrowers and the dummy for conscious gender bias. As can be seen from columns (1) to (3) of Panel B, the negative relation between the proportion of female borrowers and the write-off rate is highly significant at the 1% level (coefficients are -0.03, regardless of the estimation method).
Similarly, columns (4) to (6) indicate that an MFI that focuses on women has 1% lower writeoffs, the effects being significant at the 1% level. Overall, the results from Table 3 imply a negative association between the number of female clients and repayment, confirming Hypothesis 1.
< Insert - Table 3 . Gender and loan repayment‖ around here >
In Table 4 we use a similar methodology as in Table 3 to analyze the impact of gender on provisions, measured as the provision expense rate. As can be seen from columns (1) to (3) of Table 4 , the coefficient for the proportion of women clients is always negative and significance levels vary between 10% for RE and 1% for OLS and FEVD. This means that an MFI with a higher proportion of female clients carries significantly fewer provisions.
Similarly, columns (4) to (6) of Table 4 indicate negative coefficients for conscious gender bias, regardless of the estimation method. Regarding the control variables, the main difference with Table 3 is that NGOs carry more provisions than non-NGOs. This is not surprising, since the former are generally unregulated and often do not pay taxes, allowing them to fix their own level of provisions and write-offs. Overall, we find consistent evidence that MFIs that focus on women clients carry fewer provisions, confirming Hypothesis 2.
< Insert - Table 4 . Gender and provisions‖ around here> (b) Interaction effects
As outlined in the theory section, the effect of female focus on MFI repayment performance can be more prevalent under certain conditions or apply more for certain categories of MFIs.
Interaction terms in the regression equations are therefore included as follows:
where all variables are defined as in equation (2) and FEM i,t * INT i,t is the interaction term that measures whether the effect of gender on repayment differs with the interaction variables
Regression outputs with respect to the interaction terms are shown in Table 5 , where RE is used as the estimation method. Panel A of Table 5 analyzes gender in terms of the proportion of female clients, and Panel B measures gender in terms of the conscious gender bias dummy.
The different columns represent the different interaction terms that were added subsequently.
In the last column, all interaction variables are taken up simultaneously to study the isolated impact of each interaction. Note that the coefficient for women clients (Panel A) and conscious gender bias (Panel B) now represents the relation between gender and repayment in the reference category, whereas the sum of the reference coefficient and the coefficient for the interaction term indicate the gender repayment relation for the different categories.
As can be seen from column (1) of both Panels A and B of Table 5 , the interaction term (women clients * experience) returns an insignificant coefficient close to zero, which indicates that the relation between gender and repayment does not differ with MFI experience.
Therefore, Hypothesis 3a cannot be supported. On the other hand, when it comes to legal status, both Panels A and B of Table 5 indicate that NGOs benefit more than non-NGOs from a female focus when it comes to repayment performance. The effect not only is found in the individual regression but also persists when the other interactions are added, as can be seen from column (6). Hypothesis 3b is thus supported.
Column (3) of Panels A and B of Table 5 indicate that the relation between gender focus and repayment performance does not depend on whether the MFI provides microfinance services only or whether it has a broader scope of activities. Hypothesis 3c is thus rejected. As for regulation status and lending method, we note that the signs for the former are generally negative and the signs for the latter generally positive, and most often significant in columns (4) and (5) of both panels of Table 5 . Moreover, the signs and significance levels are upheld when all interaction variables are included (column 6). Hypotheses 3d and 3e are therefore supported. The relation between female focus and enhanced repayment is stronger for MFIs that provide individual loans and for regulated MFIs.
Overall, we find that the general positive relation between focus on women and repayment is indeed different for different categories of MFIs. We find substantial support for Hypotheses 3b, 3d, and 3e, indicating that the association between female focus on repayment varies with the MFI's legal status, regulatory status, and lending methodology. We find no support for Hypotheses 3a and 3c, indicating that the female focus -repayment relation does not vary with the MFI's experience or scope of services.
5
These findings suggest that there are two mechanisms that can actively reinforce the positive relation between women and repayment: First, MFIs that practice a more personalized, tailormade approach adapted to the needs of women are likely to increase the positive impact of women on repayment. Compared to banks, NGOs are more likely to adopt specific gender policies such as a women-friendly design of financial products. For instance, amounts and repayment modalities can be adapted to women's specific financial needs (Johnson, 2004) and collateral requirements can include female forms of property (Mayoux, 2001) . Gender policies can also include women-friendly customer relationships, such as easy procedures, flexible timing, and accessible locations of service (Mayoux, 2001) or general gender awareness in staff recruitment and staff management (Goetz, 2001; Mayoux, 2001 ).
In addition, it is easier for individual lenders to design more personalized services. In microfinance this is particularly interesting, since a common belief is that women usually enjoy group lending. However, as argued by Harper (2007) , group lending is all too often a -second-hand‖ method, and a way to shift transaction costs onto female borrowers (Mayoux, 2001; Wright, 2006; Rao, 2008) . Our findings illustrate that when women are offered individual tailor-made loans, repayment is enhanced, compared to group-lending methods.
Second, MFIs that are regulated are likely to increase the positive relation between women and repayment. This result supports Fernando (2006) , who finds that regulation can translate into more coercive enforcement methods (social pressure, verbal hostility, harassment, etc.), and that women can be more responsive to such practices. Indeed, in the face of close regulatory supervision, the MFI may install harsher enforcement policies to avoid penalties from failing to meet high repayment standards. In Bangladesh, for instance, regulation and commercialization have strongly influenced credit officers' behaviors, leading to stricter enforcement methods (Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Rahman, 1999 Rahman, , 2004 . In India, where women sometimes represent 95% of an MFI's clientele, regulation and competition constraints have led to -abusive collection methods‖ (Ghate, 2007) . non-NGOs, we want to see whether the results hold for more specific groups of MFIs. Table 6 presents split-sample regressions, where the main regressions are repeated for different MFI types. We distinguish between all MFIs, NGOs, cooperatives, and the category BANK, consisting of banks, non-bank financial institutions, and state banks. The results, shown in Table 6 , reconfirm that, in general, more women clients are associated with a lower PaR30 (Panel A), lower write-offs (Panel B), and lower provision expenses (Panel C), but that the effects are more pronounced for NGOs and cooperatives than for banks.
Outliers may be driving the statistical results. While obvious outliers have been omitted from all analyses, we want to see whether the results remain stable when enforcing tougher procedures for treating outliers. Table 7 presents an outlier robustness check, where the main analyses are repeated for the sample and observations below the fifth and above the 95th percentile for the repayment variables have been dropped. As can be seen, the coefficients of the proportion of female clients are -0.05, -0.03, and -0.03, respectively, for the PaR30, writeoff, and provision expense regressions, similar to the previous analyses. 6 Finally, in Table 8 we repeat some of the main analyses, using Tobin's truncated regressions to account for the fact that the bulk of observations for the repayment variables often lie within a very specific range and could therefore be considered dependent variables truncated above and below certain threshold values. As can be seen from Table 8 , coefficients for the gender variables remain negative, with similar confidence levels and values.
< Insert - Table 6 . Split-sample regressions for different organizational types‖ around here > < Insert - Table 7 . Robustness check for outliers‖ around here> < Insert - Table 8 . Tobit truncated regressions‖ around here >
CONCLUSIONS
This paper uses a large global data set covering 350 MFIs in 70 countries to test for gender effects on MFI repayment performance. This is important, given the undocumented popular belief that women honor their microfinance loans more readily than men. As far as we know, no rigorous worldwide empirical study has been devoted to this issue. Repayment behavior is studied through a variety of measures, such as the portfolio at risk, loan loss write-offs, and provisions. Gender is studied through the proportion of female clients, as well as a dummy The finding that individual lenders benefit more from focusing on women should motivate researchers to study further how different lending contracts influence MFI performance in general and repayment in particular. This finding should also motivate practitioners to assess whether group loans, which are often not appreciated by the poor, can be replaced with individual loans. Likewise, the finding that NGOs, in terms of repayment performance, benefit more from focusing on women is interesting in the transformation debate, where
NGOs are motivated to transform into commercial banks (Ledgerwood and White, 2006) .
As far as gender policy is concerned, our findings are mixed. Questions of repayment and MFI performance should not overshadow the more fundamental issue of the well-being of female clients. Higher repayment rates do not necessarily mean improved welfare for women.
Microfinance can contribute to female empowerment, but can also lead to the feminization of debt (Mayoux, 2001) . Moreover, good repayment performance may not necessarily correspond to client satisfaction but, conversely, can be indicative of debt traps (Cull et al., 2008) . As suggested here, improved repayment performance can stem from enforcement practices that are more feared by women than men. The implications of regulation on female repayment should thus be examined more closely.
On a wider scale, future research is needed to analyze in greater detail the reasons for better repayment by women. Is it because they are better in carrying out their businesses or are involved in types of businesses that allow for easier repayment? Is it because they are more risk averse? Or is it because women honor their contracts more so than men, or that women are easier to monitor and enforce? In addition, given that the microfinance industry is increasingly concerned with the trade-off between financial performance and social mission (Copestake, 2007; Cull et al., 2008; Hudon 2009) , it is our belief that the question of gender in this trade-off debate demands particular attention.
As any other study, this paper is not free from data limitations. While we believe that the third-party check related to rating data is a considerable improvement over unmonitored data sources, one could argue that MFIs can influence repayment variables to secure future funds from donors or improved standing with regulators. However, we see no reason why femalefocused MFIs should alter their data more than other MFIs. Second, the interaction-analyses could be influenced by non-random selection of specific groups into the dataset. While this influence cannot be fully eliminated, we believe the magnitude and composition of our sample reduce this concern. 4 It is not surprising that significance levels vary somewhat between estimation methods, given the fact that the different methods require different numbers of parameters to be estimated. Consequently, the number of degrees of freedom can vary substantially over the different methods.
5 Besides analyzing the significance of the interaction terms to see whether observed effects differ between
categories, one can also analyze the significance for each distinct subgroup by performing a test on the sum of the reference group and interaction group using the delta method. This analysis indicates that the relation between gender and repayment is highly significant for NGOs, regulated MFIs, and individual-based lenders, in line with our other analyses. 6 In another unreported outlier-robustness check, we test whether the results remain stable when dropping observations in the lowest quartile for women clients. Again, we obtain similar results. Additionally, a squared term for the proportion of female clients was added to investigate a potential nonlinear relation between gender and repayment. The coefficient of the squared term is always insignificant, and the other terms remain stable. This table presents summary statistics for key variables in our sample. Q1, Q2, and Q3 are the first, second, and third quartiles, respectively. Total assets are inferred from the balance sheet and measured in $1,000's. Loan portfolio is the total amount of loans outstanding and is measured in $1,000's. Clients is the total number of active credit and savings clients. Loan size is the average loan outstanding measured in dollars and defined as the gross outstanding portfolio per client.
Experience measures the number of years the institution has carried out microfinance activities. Employers is the number of full-time employers active in the MFI. Staff efficiency is the total number of clients divided by the number of employers. Loan officer efficiency is the total number of clients divided by the number of loan officers. Annual return is the net result before extraordinary income and expenses, donations, and taxation and is measured in $1,000's. Portfolio yield is the percentage yield on the MFI's total portfolio. OSS is measured as operating income divided by operating expenses. Costs per dollar lent are operating expenses divided by total loan portfolio. dumNGO is a dummy that is 1 if the MFI has an NGOstatus and 0 otherwise. dumRURAL is a dummy that is 1 if the MFI operates mainly or exclusively in rural areas. dumGROUP is a dummy that is 1 if the firm uses mainly group-lending methods. PaR30 is the portfolio at risk, that is, the part of the loan portfolio over 30 days overdue. Write-offs measure the portion of the total loan portfolio that has been written off and therefore accepted as a loss. Provision expense rate is the loss loan provision as a percentage of the total loan portfolio. Conscious gender bias is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the MFI has a conscious gender bias, and 0 otherwise. Women clients is the percentage of the MFI's clients who are female. Notes: Obvious special cases have been omitted from the analyses. In addition, the influence of outliers has been checked by re-running all analyses where the fifth and 95th percentiles of the variables have been removed. This robustness check is discussed in the text. Both gender variables women clients and conscious gender bias are assumed constant over the sample period. Panel A reports correlations between gender and repayment variables. Panel B reports median values in classes with a different female focus. Columns 1 to 4 report median values in classes that differ in the proportion of female borrowers. The classes correspond to different quartiles in the distribution of women clients, from very low (women clients < Q1 = 0.55) to low (Q1 = 0.55 < women clients < Q2 = 0.76) to high (Q2 = 0.76 < women clients < Q3 = 1) to very high (women clients > Q4 = 1). Columns 5 and 6 report, respectively, median values for MFIs with and without a conscious gender bias.
Panel A. Correlations
Women This table analyzes the impact of gender on loan repayment in terms of PaR30 (Panel A) and write-offs (Panel B). DumNGO is a dummy that is 1 if the MFI is an NGO, and 0 otherwise; DumGroup is a dummy that is 1 if the MFI provides loans on a group basis (such as village bankers or group lenders), and 0 otherwise; DumRURAL is 1 if the MFI operates mainly in rural areas, and 0 otherwise; and Dum performance pay is 1 if the MFI pays incentive-based salaries, and 0 otherwise. HDI is the human development index. All other variables are defined as in Table 1 . OLS indicates that pooled OLS was used as the estimation method, RE means that a pooled RE model was estimated, and FEVD means that the FEVD estimator was used. Robust standard errors clustered at the MFI level are provided in parentheses. Time dummies are included in all regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Notes: Loan size has been scaled by a factor of 1/1000 to make the coefficients easy to read. To ensure sufficient observations, gender-variables and dummies are assumed constant over the sample-period and missing observations for continuous variables are imputed with mean-values. A number of robustness checks were carried out. We experimented with the gender development index instead of the human development index. DumGROUP was divided into separate dummies for village banking (DumVill) and solidarity groups (DumSol). Finally, we experimented with the inclusion of regional dummies and obtained similar results. We analyze the impact of gender on the loan loss provisions measured in terms of the provision expense rate. DumNGO is a dummy that is 1 if the MFI is an NGO, and 0 otherwise; DumGroup is a dummy that is 1 if the MFI provides loans on a group basis (such as village bankers or group lenders), and 0 otherwise; DumRURAL is 1 if the MFI operates mainly in rural areas, and 0 otherwise; and Dum performance pay is 1 if the MFI pays incentive-based salaries, and 0 otherwise. HDI is the human development index. All other variables are defined as in Table 1 . OLS indicates that pooled OLS was used as the estimation method, RE means that a pooled RE model was estimated, and FEVD means that the FEVD estimator was used. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the MFI level are provided in parentheses. Time dummies are included in all regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dep. var. provision expense rate (1) Notes: Loan size has been scaled by a factor of 1/1000 to make coefficients easy to read. To ensure sufficient observations, gender-variables and dummies are assumed constant over the sample-period and missing observations for continuous variables are imputed with mean-values. A number of robustness checks were carried out. We experimented with the gender development index instead of the human development index. DumGROUP was divided into separate dummies for village banking (DumVill) and solidarity groups (DumSol). We experimented with the inclusion of regional dummies and obtained similar results. Finally, we carried out a robustness check where the repayment variable is the sum of PaR30 and the write-off rate, because it is the sum of the two that might indicate the MFI's ability to get loans repaid. Again, the gender variables are negative and significant. 
